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COMMENT ON RECENT DECISIONS
other grounds, the Court's dictum is completely contrary to the usual Mis-
souri piactice of remanding every criminal case involving error or omission,
the higher court assuming no power to do what the trial court should have
done originally. Even in cases of the sort discussed here, despite R. S. Mo.
(1929) 3765, giving the Supreme Court power to correct judgments erro-
neous as to time or place of imprisonment, the general practice has been to
send the record back to the trial court, there to be amended to conform to
the construction of the statute as laid down by the Supreme Court. State v.
McFadden, (1925) 309 Mo. 112, 274 S. W. 354. If the dictum in the prin-
cipal case is followed in future opinions, the Missouri courts will have
abandoned the traditional attitude of the past, and be embarked upon the
more rational and progressive tendency apparent in modern opinions on
criminal procedure.
W. H. M., '36
DOWER-EMINENT DOMAIN-EQUITABLE CoNvERSIoN-REcoNvERsIoN.-
The city of New York condemned a portion of appellant's property and
awarded him $53,258. His wife, claiming dower, filed notice of a lien on
one-third of the award and this sum was set aside to her. The husband
appealed. Held, in a 3 to 2 decision, that the inchoate right of dower is
not such an interest in land taken by eminent domain as to entitle the wife
to have a part of the award set aside for her benefit in case she survives
her husband. Inr e Cropsey Avenue, in City of New York (1935) 278 N. Y.
Supp. 815.
The instant case is of special significance because it is a direct reversal
of the New York policy expressed in Matter of N. Y. and Brooklyn Bridge
(1894) 75 Hun. 558, 27 N. Y. Supp. 597 and Simar v. Canady (1873) 53
N. Y. 298. The case accepts the view stated in Moore v. Mayor (1853)
8 N. Y. 110. The attempt of the court in the principal case to distinguish
the case at bar from that of the Brooklyn Bridge case is futile and uncon-
vincing.
All authorities agree that when land is taken by the right of eminent
domain, it is not necessary to make the wife a party to the proceeding, as
her inchoate dower is inferior to the right of the state to take land for
public purposes, and when it is so taken the inchoate dower is extinguished.
Venable v. Wabash Western R. Co. (1893) 112 Mo. 103, 20 S. W. 493;
1 Nichols, Eminent Domain (2nd ed. 1917) sec. 12; 1 Washburn, Real Prop-
erty (5th ed. 1887) pp. 577-582. There is conflict, however, as to whether
the wife is entitled to share in the proceeds of the award. The question has
been adjudicated in but a comparatively few jurisdictions the majority of
which hold that she has no right to share in the award. Moore v. Mayor,
supra; (dicta) Venable v. RR Co., supra; Flynn v. Flynn (1898) 171 Mass.
312, 50 N. E. 650, 42 L. R. A. 98; McCullough v. St. Edwards Electric Co.
(1917) 101 Neb. 802, 165 N. W. 157; Long v. Long (1919) 99 Ohio St. 330.
124 N. E. 151, 5 A. L. R. 1343; Salvatore v. Fuscellaro (R. I. 1933) 166
Atl. 26, and the principal case. New Jersey is in the vanguard for the
minority holding which maintains that the inchoate right of dower attaches
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to the fund derived from the real estate. Wheeler v. Kirtland (1875) 27
N. J. Eq. 534. This was also the rule in England before the recent statutory
abolition of dower. In 'e Hall's Estate (1870) L. R. 9 Eq. 179. The
minority view admits that the inchoate dower is not an "estate" in land,
but declares that it is a subsisting, substantial "right" possessing some of
the incidents of property, and having a present cash value. American
Blower Co. v. MacKenzie (1929) 197 N. C. 152, 147 S. E. 529.
That dower interest is a valuable property right, entitled to judicial pro-
tection, is perhaps most evidenced in actions by a wife to set aside convey-
ances the purpose of which is the destruction of the right. Byrnes v. Owens
(1926) 243 N. Y. 211, 153 N. E. 51; and even more in suits by a bride to
set aside ante-nuptial conveyances made for the purpose of defeating her
expectations of dower. Murray v. Murray (1890) 90 Ky. 1, 13 S. W. 244;
Voidick v. Kirseh (Mo. 1919) 216 S. W. 519. A search of the cases reveals
that the inchoate dower right attaches to the surplus proceeds remaining
after a sale to satisfy paramount liens, mortgages, and other encumbrances,
and that it is unaffected by a sale of the husband's land either for taxes,
or under execution to satisfy a judgment against him. Home Bldg. Corp. v.
Rosin (1923) 200 N. Y. Supp. 814; Mills v. Van T/oorhies (1859) 20 N. Y.
412; Thompson v. MeCorkle (1893) 136 Ind. 484, 34 N. E. 813; Pingree V.
De Haven (1925) 90 Fla. 42, 105 So. 147; 19 C. J. 496, The purpose of
dower is to provide for the support of the wife after the husband's decease,
Walsh, Law of Property (2nd ed. 1927) sec. 97, and the courts should avoid
doctrines by which dower may be barred or extinguished.
The principal case puts much weight on the proposition that the char-
acter of the realty was changed into personalty by the award and that
dower does not attach to the "cash." This contention is impotent, for dower
has been allowed in the "cash" surplus arising from a foreclosure sale.
Kitchen v. Jones (1908) 87 Ark. 502, 113 S. W. 29; 19 L. R. A. (N. S.)
723; In 'e Knapp (1898) 54 N. Y. Supp. 927; 11 An. & Eng. Eno. Law
(2nd ed.) p. 210. Such a view also entirely overlooks the doctrines of
"equitable conversion" and "reconversion."
Equitable conversion has been defined as the constructive change of
property from realty to personalty, or from personalty into realty, exist-
ing in the intendment of equity. Bispham, Principles of Equity (1919) sec.
307. It is the logical expression of the maxim that equity regards that as
done which ought to be done, Moore v. Kernachan (1922) 133 Va. 206, 112
S. E. 632, and it is admitted in order that the rights of parties may be en-
forced and preserved. Foster's Appeal (1873) 74 Pa. 391. The doctrine is
generally applied to those cases where land directed to be converted into
money is treated as money. Marcey v. Graham (1925) 142 Va. 285, 128
S. E. 550; N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Cottle (1919) 168 N. Y. Supp. 463.
It is not limited to such situations, however, and the courts have generally
held that funds realized from the judicial sale of a decedent's land par-
take of the same rules of distribution as the property which they represent,
i. e., the money is treated as realty. M'Learn v. Wallace (U. S. 1836) 10
Pet. 625; State ex rel. Enyart v. Doud (1925) 216 Mo. App. 480, 269 S. W.
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923. The instant case could have followed the reasoning of In re Tatham's
Esate (1915) 250 Pa. 269, 95 Atl. 520, in which damages paid to the
executors in trust for realty condemned during the widow's lifetime was
held to be distributable as realty, and not as personalty.
The court also failed to consider the doctrine of reconversion, which is
an imaginary process by which a constructive conversion is countermanded
and the converted property restored to its original status in the contempla-
tion of the law, at the election of the parties entitled to the property, or by
operation of law. Bishpam, Principles of Equity, supra; Chandler, Recon-
version in Missouri, 12 St. L. L. Rev. 175 et seq. Although the gen-
eral rule under the doctrine is that all of those having a beneficial interest
in the property converted must consent to a reconversion (Wyatt V. Still-
man Institute [1924] 303 Mo. 94, 260 S. W. 73), it has been held that
where the direction is for a conversion of money (as for example, the
award) into realty (to which the right of dower would unquestionably at-
tach) only one of the beneficiaries need elect to reconvert as to her share.
Seely v. Jago (1717) 1 P. Wins. 389, 24 Eng. Rep. 438. The New York
court could have reached a more equitable decision by following Nall V. Nall
(1912) 243 Mo. 247, 147 S. W. 1006, and Griffith v. Witten (1913) 252 Mo.
627, 161 S. W. 708, to the effect that at the option of the beneficiary, prop-
erty which became money as a result of the conversion may be regarded as
realty.
Since it is the policy of the law to protect dower at all hazards, the in-
choate right should be preserved under the circumstances of the principal
case as well as otherwise. The contrary view should be confined to con-
troversies between the state and the wife of one whose property is con-
demned; for the reason behind the rule vanishes when the question arises
as between the parties to the marriage in connection with the fund which
is the substitute for the real property taken. Young and Carswell J. J.,
dissenting in the principal case. The better view would appear to be for
the court to order that one-third of the total award be deposited in trust
for the wife contingent on her surviving the husband, with the annual in-
come of the fund going to the husband.
W. F. '37.
EQUITY-INJuNcTIONs-LBEL.-Counterclaim by defendants alleging
that complainant and its servants and agents made false statements as
to the quality of its products and that complainant circulated false state-
ments concerning defendant corporation intending to injure the defendants
in business and to deceive the public and the defendants' customers. Held:
Counterclaim dismissed. The Court of Chancery is without jurisdiction
to restrain injury to business or property threatened by false representa-
tion as to character, quality, or title of property, nor does its jurisdiction
extend to cases of libel or slander. A. Hollander & Son, Inc. v. Jos. Hol-
lander, Inc., (N. J. Eq. 1935) 177 At. 80.
That equity will not restrain by injunction the threatened publication of
a libel, as such, however great the injury to property may appear to be,
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